The next two relate to epistemology and skepticism. The first is about the philosophical implications of the movie The Matrix. If Neo read it, he'd say "whoa."
The last link is an interesting take on skeptical scenarios (or what our textbook fancily calls universal belief falsifiers). Most of us think it's pretty unlikely that we're in a computer simulation like the Matrix. After all, these skeptical scenarios seem so weird. But Nick Bostrom provides some compelling reasons to think that these scenarios may be highly probable, after all.
(A more advanced version of Bostrom's argument is available here, and a dinosaur comic on this issue is available here.) By the way, if you have any links you think I or others in class might find interesting, let me know. And feel free to comment on any of these posts.
11 comments:
Thanks Sean- I love the Bostrom piece. I first came across it about a year ago in New Scientist magazine, but the version you posted is even better as it contains an extra paragraph or two not contained in the magazine. Some random thoughts on the piece:
· While Bostrom simply asks us to suppose that proposition two is false, I believe that an easy case can be made that #2 is by far the least likely of the three. While it’s only a data point of one, I believe the behavior of our own civilization lends some justification to the idea that #2 is unlikely. The popularity of computer simulation games like Sim City and Civilization, as well as our fascination with reality TV indicate our strong desire to “see what will happen” in simulated/contrived environments and situations. In addition, industry and the military both make extensive use of computer-based simulations for the purpose of improving decision-making and training personnel. While it’s hard to extrapolate what the majority of civilizations might be like based on a sample size of one, Bostrom’s ground rules allow us to reject #2 merely if the “fraction of … civilizations … interested … in simulations… is almost zero.” Obviously “almost” is the key word here, but in the absence of a more definitive definition from Bostrom, I’m satisfied that I’m not making a major leap of faith in rejecting #2 when 100% of the civilizations we are aware of, are very interested in simulations of all kinds.
· Bostrom’s argument makes no assumption on the time it takes develop the technological capacity to run such simulations. He says, “even if it takes 10 million years, it makes no difference to the argument.” While I believe that statement is technically accurate regarding his conclusion that only one of the three propositions can be true, it seems rather obvious that it is paramount in determining whether or not #1 or #3 is more likely. Let’s face it- the higher the number of civilizations that attain the technological capacity to create such sims, the greater the chance of proposition three being true. But what if the time necessary for civilizations to develop such a capacity is so prohibitive that it’s simply unlikely that any of them ever advance to that point in the first place? Even discounting destruction from within a civilization, there would seem to be some finite limit for any civilization to attain such computing power. I won’t hazard a guess at what the upper limit might be. But shit happens- Asteroids and comets. Gamma ray bursts. The death of stars. Black holes eat entire solar systems. So to say that it doesn’t matter how long it takes for the average civilization to reach the level necessary to create these sims, seems a bit disingenuous. The shorter the amount of time it would theoretically take a civilization to reach technological maturity, the greater the chances that proposition number three is true.
· Lastly- I have discussed this idea with some friends and gotten mixed reactions. And quite frankly, I have to admit that I don’t really understand those who somehow feel that their existence would be cheapened, were proposition three to be true. Even if you knew it to be true, what has really changed? Your existence would still be the same today, as it was yesterday. And that existence would be real- just as Ludwig’s (from our Philosophy book) existence and experience was every bit as real as yours or mine.
And lastly- it’s important to remember that the Giants still suck.
Jim
Nice comment, Jim! Here are some responses to your thoughts:
-Yeah, the second case (technologically advanced civilizations won't be interested in running computer simulations) does seem pretty unlikely. Lots of people would be interested in these simulations! Bostrom has a longer discussion of the unlikelihood of this case in his detailed article.
-This is a good point. The chances might be low that a nuclear war will wipe us all out in the next 10 years, but the chances increase significantly with the more time you allow. I'm thinking the chances of a nuclear holocaust (or meteor, or whatever) in the next 10 million years are pretty high.
-You're right: a lot of people DO prefer reality to an identical simulation, even though the two are indistinguishable experiences. We'll be talking about this in our section on ethics and utilitarianism. One reason for this preference may be that people care about truth for its own sake. Check out the experience machine for more on this issue.
-I will NEVER forget that the Giants suck.
The Experience Machine Cometh
One major difference (as I see it) between finding out you live in a Bostrom simulation, and deciding whether or not to enter into the Experience Machine comes down to home field advantage. If I find out today that I live in a Bostrom sim, I'm not sure why I ought to assume that those running the sim live in a universe that would even vaguely resemble the one I've known all my life. I know for a fact that I'm well fit for this world, so I'd be content and happy to remain here and not feel the slightest bit devalued by the knowledge that it was created by some other entity- another entity potentially living in a completely different reality. Potentially one with different laws of physics. Different mathematics. Different everything. I don’t see how I could feel “cheated” knowing that such a place existed and that I wasn’t there. I guess when it comes down to ideas like reality and consciousness; I’m not even sure what it means to be simulated. Is that just a fancy name for “created”? Heck, lots of people I know walk around steadfast in the belief that this universe was designed from top to bottom by a supreme being and it doesn't bother them a whit. Strangely enough, many of those same folks were the most disturbed by Bostrom's views.
Now getting back to home field advantage- when it comes to the Experience Machine, the reverse is true. Nozick asks whether we’d enter the machine after “programming [our] life’s desires?” My first thought is “that’s a pretty tall order”. One great thing about life is that you never end up where you expected. I’m sure that, had I planned “my life’s desires” ten years ago, I probably would have left out most of the events that ended up being the most fulfilling and satisfying to me. Plus I believe that there would be a tendency to focus on planning all of life’s “highs” with nary a “low” to be found (isn’t that the idea of this machine, after all?). But how do we appreciate our successes, if we are bereft of failures against which to measure them? And should one argue that I would then be wise to incorporate some lows into the mix, because I obviously find value and meaning in experiencing them- I guess what it comes down to is that I don’t feel competent to successfully orchestrate decades worth of a fulfilled existence. And why should I have to? The home-field advantage of living it out day by day is plenty fulfilling for me. That is of course, unless at some point in the past I actually did enter the Experience Machine and I am now living out a previously choreographed life- in that case, I must say- nice work Jim.
Again, great thoughts, Jim! In general, I really like your home-field advantage point. Way to notice RELEVANT DISSIMILARITIES between the Experience Machine and the Matrix! Here are some more responses to specific points:
(1) Why "assume that those running the sim live in a universe that would even vaguely resemble the one I've known all my life"?
-It's a reasonable inference to the best explanation. They'd run sims on all sorts of things, but mostly stuff that would help them figure out their own world. So I'd presume that many of the parameters of many of the simulated worlds would match their real world.
(2) "I don’t see how I could feel 'cheated' knowing that such a place existed and that I wasn’t there."
-I think it's natural to feel cheated when you find out that there's an interesting place, but you can't visit it. In general, I understand feeling devalued when you discover that what you thought of as EVERYTHING is just one small experiment out of a huge number of experiments being run in another realm entirely. Suddenly, your own life seems less important in comparison.
(3) "I’m not even sure what it means to be simulated. Is that just a fancy name for 'created'?"
-This is a great question.
(4) "I guess what it comes down to is that I don’t feel competent to successfully orchestrate decades worth of a fulfilled existence."
-I really like this epistemic modesty.
(5) "The home-field advantage of living it out day by day is plenty fulfilling for me."
-OK, maybe for you, because your life has turned out to be decent overall. But many people have fairly harsh lives. None of us are guaranteed to lead fulfilling lives. Well, except those who know how to enter the Experience Machine...
Good stuff Sean. Thoughts below.
1) It's a reasonable inference to the best explanation. They'd run sims on all sorts of things, but mostly stuff that would help them figure out their own world. So I'd presume that many of the parameters of many of the simulated worlds would match their real world.
-Great point, so I won’t even try to argue with it.
2) I think it's natural to feel cheated when you find out that there's an interesting place, but you can't visit it. In general, I understand feeling devalued when you discover that what you thought of as EVERYTHING is just one small experiment out of a huge number of experiments being run in another realm entirely. Suddenly, your own life seems less important in comparison.
-This is one I’m really trying to understand. I guess it’s easy for me to deal with Bostrom’s ideas because my philosophy (Bobby Brown style) has been that what’s outside our universe is by definition unknowable. So I don’t have to break down and discard what it was that I thought I knew in order to accept that I’m running in a sim. But I can now see how that could be a troubling realization for many people. Although I have no first hand experience with it, I would bet it might be like finding out later in life that you are adopted.
Your last point is also a very good one. Humans have a storied history of over-valuing their importance and significance in the grand scheme of things. And their desire to hold onto that “specialness”, even in the face of evidence to the contrary, lends quite a bit of credence to the notion that they'd feel disapointed were Bostrom to be right.
3) OK, maybe for you, because your life has turned out to be decent overall. But many people have fairly harsh lives. None of us are guaranteed to lead fulfilling lives. Well, except those who know how to enter the Experience Machine...
-Well now I just feel like a prick.
RE: Why Pigs Don’t Have Wings?
I read Fodor's piece on natural selection and I believe a great deal of his concerns over whether or not natural selection is a correct view of evolution, could be cleared up by the realization that natural selection acts on genes, and not phenotypes. They're not one in the same, although in some cases they undoubtedly are. As a result, I disagree with his position that the fact that phenotypes evolve without direct influence of natural selection is an indictment of the process of itself. It just merely means that natural selection does not act directly on phenotypes- it acts on genes. An admittedly over-simplified example of this would be a gene that expressed itself via two distinct phenotypes:
* Phenotype A allows an organism to shoot laser beams at it's prey and kill them instantly. Surely this is a phenotype that would be strongly selected for by natural selection, were natural selection to act at that level.
however
* Phenotype B causes a congenital heart condition, which kills the organism before child bearing years.
Keep in mind that in this example BOTH of these phenotypes are expressed at the same time by any organism that carries this gene. Clearly in this example the gene will be selected against by natural selection (which is ashame because lasers are pretty cool).
However, should this gene mutate, thereby causing a change in the way Phenotype B expresses itself, so that the organism is able to reach child bearing years, this gene would now be selected for by natural selection (all things being equal of course).
Those who have the blood disorder sickle cell amenia are a living example of natural selection walking a fine line between a gene which offers a mixture of simulataneous "good" and "bad" phenotypes. It's an extremely painful disease with a whole host of unfortunate complications- however it does have the benefit of offerring some protection against malaria, which is why the disease is more common in peoples indigenous to areas of the world where malaria is common.
I should finish up by stating that it's very possible that I'm completely wrong on all of this- clearly I'm no expert on the subject. I tried a quick search of the net after reading the article in order to confirm my thoughts on this via the "experts", but didn't find much. Again, I'm no expert, but I bet Dawkins would agree with my point of view here.
Jerry Fodor was criticized heavily by philosophers for that article: see in particular here and here, along with here and here for a similar point to your own, plus Fodor's amusing response here, plus a final back-and-forth here and here.
Fodor's obviously out of my league with his philosophical arguments. I'd love to take him on again on matters of biology, but that's not what this class is about. I do wish that Dawkins would chime in, and I'm surprised he hasn't. He is usually quite agitated by anyone who mischaracterizes what he deems to be the "correct" view of evolution. Hey, for all I know he thinks Fodor has some valid points- in which case I'd love to hear from him all the more.
Oh, and another thing- as a result of reading Fodor's thoughts on biology, I no longer plan to read Dawkin's "The God Delusion". I think learned a valuable lesson from all of this- leave biology to biologists, and the really big questions to philospohers.
I haven't read The God Delusion, but most of the reviews from sources I trust don't think much of it. His Fresh Air interview didn't impress me, either.
Still, I wouldn't be so quick to leave philosophy to the philosophers, Jim. There's a great case to be made for deferring to someone's expertise in most fields. In philosophy, though, deference might not be appropriate.
I enjoyed Orr's review- particularly regarding Dawkins's approach to determining whether or not religion on the whole, is good or bad for society. While I haven't read the book, I'm familiar with the arguments Dawkins and some the other anti-religous authors (Harris, Hitchens, etc) have put forth in their attempt to lay bare religion as an all-encompassing societal scourge. And I completely agree with Orr, that the methodology and arguments they use seem to be particularly dishonest (actually Orr doesn't really say they're dishonest, but I think they are). Which is ashame because I think the question is a valid, interesting and very important one- one which deserves a more honest approach than they've given it.
With that in mind, I'm curious if you have any recommendations on the subject by popular philosphers (ie- someone I'd "get").
Here are a few I've heard good things about:
Pro-God
-The Existence of God by Richard Swinburne
-Warranted Christian Belief by Alvin Plantinga
Anti-God
-Why I am Not a Christian by Bertrand Russell
-God and the Burden of Proof by Keith Parsons
I've only read parts of some of these, so I'm not sure how difficult these are, but I bet you can follow them.
Post a Comment