Here are some links on ethical relativism. The first is an interview with a moral psychologist who supports a sophisticated version of ethical relativism.
The second one is an advanced overview of various versions of moral relativism:
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I'm not sure if we're done discussing utilitarianism in class or not, but here are my thoughts on it based on Wednesday's lecture:
I like the idea that our actions should be guided by what maximizes humanity's happiness. However, strict Utitlitarianism would lead us to some strange conclusions about morality in certain cases. Consider the following hypothetical:
* An individual "violates" a person who is in a coma. I think most (hopefully all) of us would agree that this type of action is reprehensible. However, utilitarianism leads us to the conclusion that this is a moral action because it has the effect of raising overall happiness (this is assuming that the pervert is happy about what he did, and also assuming that the person in the coma is not aware of what occurred).
One could easily come up with countless other hypotheticals that would seem to turn our good senses upside-down were we to subscribe fully to Utitlitarianism. Further, I find any moral code which disposes of an individual's intentions to the exclusion of the consequences of their actions as lacking. Certainly the outcome of an action should have a bearing on whether we view it as moral or immoral, but if we grant it exclusive status in that regard we run the risk of arriving at bizzare conclusions which again strain our good senses. Consider the case of Jesse Timmendequa, a repeated violent sexual offender, who savagely raped and murdered young Megan Kanka- an act which subsequently led to passage of Megan's Law which requires sex offenders to register their home address with local authorities. Now, even if one were to grant that passage of such a law had subsequently prevented a number of young girls from sufferring the same fate as Megan Kanka, I hope you feel as nauseous as I do at the thought of labeling Timmendequa's actions as moral.
Hi, anonymous! So we did wind up discussing some criticisms of utilitarianism in class last week, but you brought up a pair of great objections we didn't discuss:
(1) Many are reluctant to agree that the happiness resulting from abhorrent behavior (like the case you describe) counts as a positive factor in judging the morality of that behavior. Is the euphoria of a heroin addict right after shooting up relevant as she destroys her life? How about the twisted glee of a serial killer? Now, in most of these cases, the overall painful effects outweigh the pleasure, so happy ethics would say they're immoral. But should we concede that there are any positive elements in these cases?
(2) Your last point is a nice one: it highlights the vagueness of what it means to "bring about" positive results. Timmendequa clearly did not directly bring about any positive results. The immediate consequences were very bad. But his actions did indirectly lead to many positive results much later on. How far should we track the results of an action to judge it? There is a butterfly effect worry. We may never finish judging an action if its consequences continue endlessly.
Utilitarians do offer response to these. For (1), most bite the bullet and say that all happiness is relevant--even the happiness of a serial killer. The pain they cause nearly always swamps the pleasure derived from it, but in very weird cases it might not.
For (2), utilitarians say you can draw a line between consequences that matter and consequences that don't. Relevant consequences are direct, or immediate, or rationally foreseeable. Drawing this kind of line without begging the question is a tricky task, though.
Anyway, I'm sure we could have fun going back and forth on these issues for a long time. This is what I so enjoy about philosophy! All in all, though, you offered some insightful evaluation, anonymous!!
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